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THE CISG AND THE CHOICE OF LAW: TWO WORLDS APART? 
Francesca Ragno* 
I. PARTY AUTONOMY AND CISG CONTRACTS 
The principle of party autonomy,1 despite the controversy surrounding 
its theoretical foundation,2 is one of the cornerstones3 of contemporary 
conflict of laws.4 The freedom to choose the applicable law is seen as an 
essential component of the liberal model of market regulation5 as well as a 
tool “of private ordering intended to reduce the risks of international 
transactions.”6 Granting litigants the possibility to select the governing law 
to their relationship7 promotes legal predictability,8 thereby reducing costs 
associated with uncertainty,9 and is justified on grounds of commercial 
                                                                                                                           
 
* Professor Ragno is an Associate Professor of Public International Law and Governance of 
International Crises, University of Verona, School of Law. 
1 On the idea that the origin of the doctrine of party autonomy can be traced back to the scholarship 
of Pasquale Stanislao Mancini see YUKO NISHITANI, MANCINI UND DIE PARTEIAUTONOMIE IM 
INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHT: EINE UNTERSUCHUNG AUF DER GRUNDLAGE DER NEU ZUTAGE 
GEKOMMENEN KOLLISIONSRECHTLICHEN VORLESUNGEN MANCINIS 190 (2000). 
2 See Jürgen Basedow, The Law of Open Societies—Private Ordering and Public Regulation of 
International Relations, 360 RECUEIL DES COURS 164 (2013); see also Alex Mills, Rethinking Jurisdiction 
in International Law, 83 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 187, 231 (2014). 
3 GABRIELLA CARELLA, AUTONOMIA DELLA VOLONTÀ E SCELTA DI LEGGE NEL DIRITTO 
INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO (Cacucci 1999); see generally Stephan Leible Parteiautonomie im IPR—
Allgemeines Anknüpfungsprinzip oder Verlegenheitslösung, 1, 495 (2004). 
4 Throughout this article the terms “private international law,” “conflict of laws” and “choice of 
law” will be used interchangeably to refer to the rules dealing with the question of the applicable law. 
5 Horatia Muir Watt, “Party Autonomy” in International Contracts: From the Makings of a Myth 
to the Requirements of Global Governance, 3 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 250, 254 (2010). 
6 Basedow, supra note 2, at 35. 
7 Jan-Japp Kuipers, Party Autonomy in the Brussels I Regulation and Rome I Regulation and the 
European Court of Justice, 10 GERMAN L.J. 1505, 1518–19 (2009). 
8 George A. Zaphiriou, Choice of Forum and Choice of Law Clauses in International Commercial 
Agreements, 3 MD. J. INT’L L. 311 (1978). 
9 Erik Jayme, Rechtssicherheit und Vorhersehbarkeit als Grundwerte des Internationalen 
Privatrechts—Betrachtungen zum Lebenswerk von Karl Firsching, in GERECHTIGKEIT IM 
INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHT IM WANDEL DER ZEIT 33 (Peter Gottswald et al. eds., 1992); UGO 
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convenience.10 This is because autonomy protects the expectations of those 
involved in the transaction,11 who are assumed to be the “rational maximizers 
of their own welfare and have idiosyncratic knowledge about their 
preferences unavailable to anybody else.”12 From this perspective, the 
recognition of party autonomy as a relevant connecting factor clearly 
represents the reconceptualized private international law vis-à-vis the 
classical state-focused paradigm.13 
                                                                                                                           
 
VILLANI, LA CONVENZIONE DI ROMA SULLA LEGGE APPLICABILE AI CONTRATTI 66 (Bari Carucci ed., 
2d ed. 2000); Francesca C. Villata, La legge applicabile ai “contratti dei mercati regolamentati” nel 
regolamento Roma I, in LIBER FAUSTO POCAR—VOL. II: NUOVI STRUMENTI DEL DIRITTO 
INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO 977 (2009); Angelo Davì & Alessandra Zanobetti, Autonomia delle parti e 
certezza del diritto nei Principi dell’Aja sulla scelta della legge applicabile ai contratti commerciali 
internazionali, 31 DIRITTO DEL COMMERCIO INTERNAZIONALE 881, 907 (2017). 
10 Erin A. O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1151, 1153 (2000); C.G.J. Morse, The EEC Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations, 2 Y.B. EU. L. 107, 116 (1982). 
11 Davì & Zanobetti, supra note 9, at 891. 
12 For this expression, see Gisela Rühl, Party Autonomy in the Private International Law of 
Contracts: Transatlantic Convergence and Economic Efficiency, in CONFLICT OF LAWS IN A GLOBALIZED 
WORLD 153, 177 (2007). 
13 Matthias Lehmann, Liberating the Individual from Battles Between States: Justifying Party 
Autonomy in Conflict of Laws, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 381, 413 (2008) (“The justification of party 
autonomy has to start by recalibrating the problem of conflicts. The issue is not, as most theories suggest, 
a struggle between states for the application of their respective laws. It is important to move beyond that 
idea and instead think about when and why conflict problems start in the first place: conflicts of laws 
begin with a dispute between individuals.”); see also Mills, supra note 2, at 187. 
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Party autonomy14 appears15 to be, in particular, “the bedrock and the 
pivot of international cross-border contracts”16 and finds its “alter ego” in the 
principle of freedom of contract.17 The primary role of party autonomy in 
matters of contractual obligations has been clearly embraced in various 
national legal systems18 and in important regional instruments, like the Rome 
                                                                                                                           
 
14 For the classification of party autonomy as a “principle of law recognized by civilized nations” 
within the meaning of Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, see RICHARD PLENDER 
& MICHAEL WILDERSPIN, THE EUROPEAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 131 (Sweet 
& Maxwell eds., 3d ed. 2009). 
15 It should be noted that, after originally having been limited to contractual obligations, party 
autonomy is now also recognized in areas such as torts, succession and family law. See Hague Conference 
on Private International Law [hereinafter HCCH], Protocol on the Law Applicable to Maintenance 
Obligations, art. 7 (Nov. 23, 2007), https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=133; 
see also HCCH, Protocol on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations, art. 8 (Nov. 23, 2007), 
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=133; see also HCCH, Convention on the 
Law Applicable to Certain Rights in Respect of Securities held with an Intermediary, art. 4 (July 5, 2006), 
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=72; see also HCCH, Convention of 
1 August 1989 on the Law Applicable to Succession to the Estates of Deceased Persons, art. 5 (Aug. 1, 
1989), https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=62; see also HCCH, 1986 Hague 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, art. 7 (Dec. 22, 1986), 
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=61; see also HCCH, Convention of 
14 March 1978 on the Law Applicable to Agency, art. 5 (Mar. 14, 1978), https://www.hcch.net/en/ 
instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=89. 
16 See FRANCO FERRARI & FRANCESCA RAGNO, CROSS-BORDER LITIGATION IN EUROPE: THE 
BRUSSELS I RECAST REGULATION AS A PANACEA? 98 (Franco Ferrari & Francesca Ragno eds., 2015) 
(discussing Peter Mankowski, The Role of Party Autonomy in the Allocation of Jurisdiction in Contractual 
Matters, in CROSS BORDER LITIGATION IN EUROPE: THE BRUSSELS I RECAST REGULATION AS A 
PANACEA? (Franco Ferrari & Francesca Ragno eds., 2015)). See also ADRIAN BRIGGS, AGREEMENTS ON 
JURISDICTION AND CHOICE OF LAW 481 (2008); Fausto Pocar, La protection de la partie faible en droit 
international privé, 188 RECUEIL DES COURS 372 (1984)). 
17 Peter Nygh, Contractual autonomy and its limits, 251 RECUEIL DES COURS 297 (1995). 
18 For the United States, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS: LAW OF THE STATE 
CHOSEN BY THE PARTIES § 187.2 (AM. LAW INST. 1969); see also U.C.C. § 1-301 (AM. LAW INST. & 
UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001); see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 3540 (1992). For other jurisdictions, see generally 
Zhonghua Remnin Gongheguo Shewai Minsi Guanxi Falü Syiyong Fa [Law on People’s republic of China 
Applicable to Foreign-related Civil Relations] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Oct. 28, 2010, effective Apr. 1, 2011), art. 3 (China); see also Act Governing the Choice of Law 
in Civil Matters Involving Foreign Elements, art. 20 (June 6, 1953) (Taiwan, Republic of China), 
https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawHistory.aspx?pcode=B0000007; see also Hō no tekiyō ni 
kansuru tsūokuhō [Act on the General Rules for Application of Laws], Law. No.10 of 1898, art. 7 (Japan); 
Act on Private International Law, Act. No. 6465 Apr. 7, 2001, amended by Act. No. 13759, Jan. 19, 2016, 
art. 25 (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Legislation Research Institute online database, http://elaw.klri.re.kr/ 
eng_service/lawView.do?hseq=37432&lang=ENG; see also LEGGE FEDERAL SUL DIRITTO 
INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATE (LDIP), CODICE CIVILE [CC], [Federal Law on the Rights of Private 
International Law], Dec. 18, 1987, RS 291, art. 116 (Switz.) [hereinafter LDIP]. 
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I Regulation19 and the Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to 
International Contracts, signed in Mexico City in 1994 (“Mexico 
Convention”).20 In recent time, party autonomy’s paramount importance in 
the realm of choice of law21 has also been authoritatively recognized in the 
very first global legal instrument dealing with choice of law in international 
commercial contracts, namely the Hague Principles on Choice of Law in 
International Commercial Contracts (“Hague Principles”).22 This instrument, 
which was clearly designed to complete the Hague Convention on choice of 
court agreements,23 and constitutes the first non-binding legal instrument 
produced by the Hague Conference, aims at promoting party autonomy and 
ensuring that the law chosen by the parties has the widest scope of 
application, subject to clearly defined limits.24 
                                                                                                                           
 
19 Commission Regulation 593/2008 of June 17, 2008, on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations (Rome I), art. 3, 2008 O.J. (L 177) [hereinafter Rome I]. For a comprehensive comment on 
this provision, see GRALF-PETER CALLIESS, ROME REGULATIONS: COMMENTARY ON THE EUROPEAN 
RULES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 76 (Gralf-Peter Calliess ed., 2d ed. 2015). 
20 Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to 
International Contracts, art. 7, Mar. 17, 1994, O.A.T.S. 78 (also known as the “Mexico Convention”). For 
more on this Convention, see generally Diego P. Fernández Arroyo, La Convention interaméricaine sur 
la loi applicable aux contrats internationaux: certains chemins conduisent au-delà de Rome, in 84 REVUE 
CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATINAL PRIVÉ 178 (1995); Friedrich K. Juenger, The Inter-American 
Convention on the Law Applicable to International Contracts: Some Highlights and Comparisons, 42 
AM. J. COMP. L. 381 (1994). 
21 Symeon C. Symeonides, The Hague Principles on Choice of Law for International Contracts: 
Some Preliminary Comments, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 873, 875 (2013). 
22 HHCH, Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts, Mar. 19, 2015, 
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=135. For further details on these 
Principles, see generally Jürgen Basedow, The Hague Principles on Choice of Law: Their Addressees and 
Impact, 22 UNIFORM L. REV. 304 (2017); see also Katherina Boele-Woelki, Party Autonomy in Litigation 
and Arbitration in View of the Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts, 
in 379 RECUEIL DES COURS 53 (2015); see also Daniel Girsberger & Neil B. Cohen, Key Features of the 
Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts, 22 UNIFORM L. REV. 316 
(2017); Davi & Zanobetti, supra note 9, at 881; Andreas Schwartze, New Trends in Parties’ Options to 
Select the Applicable Law? The Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International Contracts in a 
Comparative Perspective, 12 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 87 (2015). 
23 Hans van Loon, The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements—An Introduction, 
18 ANNALS FAC. L. U. ZENICA 11, 12 (2016) (Both instruments have the goal of “removing obstacles to 
productive commercial relations, which are best served by party autonomy, at least in the relations 
between parties of more or less comparable economic bargaining power, and as long as strong public 
interests are respected.”). 
24 HCCH, Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts, supra note 22, at 
pmbl. ¶ 1. 
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The large recognition of party autonomy around the globe has 
progressively determined that choice of law agreements nowadays are a 
powerful tool of transaction planning.25 It is therefore a common occurrence 
that international sales contracts (potentially) governed by the CISG contain 
a pactum de lege utenda.26 Since a scrutiny on such agreements is in some 
instances required in order to determine the very same applicability of the 
CISG, the question that arises is how this scrutiny should be conducted. In 
this Article, this conundrum will be investigated by stressing the particular 
nature of a choice of law agreement and its autonomous standing vis-à-vis 
the international sales contract in which it is incorporated. This will draw 
attention to the private international law of the forum as the reference system 
to be relied upon. In this perspective, and with the aim of understanding the 
practical implications of a conflict of laws approach, an analysis will be 
conducted on the relevant provisions of the Rome I Regulation, which is the 
regime to be employed by the courts of the majority of EU Member States. 
II. THE CHOICE OF LAW AGREEMENT AS A FACTOR TRIGGERING OR 
EXCLUDING THE APPLICABILITY OF THE CISG 
The most obvious case in which a choice of law agreement bears an 
effect on the applicability on the CISG occurs pursuant to Article 1(1)(b). As 
is well known, this criterion,27 which denotes the constructive interaction 
                                                                                                                           
 
25 See RONALD A. BRAND, TRANSACTION PLANNING USING RULES ON JURISDICTION AND THE 
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS 194–95 (2014). 
26 STEFAN KRÖLL, LOUKAS A. MISTELIS, MARIA DEL PILAR PERALES VISCASILLAS, UN 
CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES OF GOODS (CISG) 104 (2d ed. 2018) (“More than 80% of 
international contracts will normally contain a choice of law clause. In this way the parties may purport 
to opt out of the CISG and subject their contract to another law.”). 
27 See Chirstophe Bernasconi, The Personal and Territorial Scope of the Vienna Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 46 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 137 (1999); Petra Butler & Bianca 
Mueller, Article 1 CISG—The Gateway to the CISG, 21 CISG & LATIN AM. 379 (2016); Isaak I. Dore, 
Choice of Law Under the International Sales Convention: A U.S. Perspective, 77 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 521 
(1983); Franco Ferrari, CISG Article 1(1)(b) and Related Matters: Brief Remarks on the Occasion of a 
Recent Dutch Court Decision, NEDERLANDS INTERNATIONAAL PRIVAATRECHT 317 (1995); H. PÜNDER, 
Das Einheitliche UN-Kaufrecht—Anwendung kraft kollisionsrechtlicher Verweisung nach Art 1 Abs 1 lit 
b UN-Kaufrecht, RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT 869 (1990); Peter Winship, Private 
International Law and the U.N. Sales Convention, 21 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 487 (1988), for information on 
this criterion. 
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between the uniform regime and private international law,28 provides that the 
Convention is applicable, where one or even both parties do not have their 
places of business in Contracting States, provided that the private 
international law of the forum29 identifies the law of a Contracting State as 
the governing law (and provided that the parties did not opt out the CISG). 
Thus, if the private international law rules of the lex fori recognizes the 
principle of party autonomy, then the selection of the law of a contracting 
State,30 such as “Italian” or “French” law, leads to the applicability of the 
CISG.31 
A choice of law agreement, however, may also be a factor barring the 
applicability of the CISG in its entirety. Since Article 6 of the CISG is 
commonly understood as allowing parties to implicitly opt out of the 
Convention as a whole by way of the designation of the law of a non-
                                                                                                                           
 
28 Franco Ferrari, What Sources of Law for Contracts for the International Sale of Goods? Why 
One Has to Look Beyond the CISG, INT’L R. OF L. & ECON. 314, 320–21 (2005). 
29 For the purpose of this analysis, it is assumed that the competent forum sits in a Contracting State 
that has not declared an Article 95 declaration. 
30 A completely different question is whether the CISG is applicable when the parties choose the 
CISG as the law governing the contract and the CISG is not applicable on its own terms. For a discussion 
of the effects of such an opting-in see Michael Bridge, Choice of Law and the CISG: Opting In and Opting 
Out, in DRAFTING CONTRACTS UNDER THE CISG 65, 71 (Harry M. Flechtner & Ronald A. Brand eds., 
2008); FRANCO FERRARI, CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS: APPLICABILITY AND 
APPLICATIONS OF THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS SALES CONVENTION 179 (2012); Harry. M. Flechtner & 
Ronald A. Brand, Opting In to the CISG: Avoiding the Redline Products Problems, in A TRIBUTE TO 
JOSEPH M. LOOKOFSKY 95, 112 (Mads Bryde Andersen & Rene Franz Henschel eds., 2015). See also 
Tribunale di Padova Sez. Este [Dist. Ct.], 11 Gennaio 2005 (It.), https://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/ 
050111i3.html. 
31 Bridge, supra note 30, at 78 (“A reference to the law of a Contracting State might be seen as the 
most direct way of importing the CISG via Article 1(1)(b).”); see also JOSEPH LOOKOFSKY, 
UNDERSTANDING THE CISG, 27 (2017). See RB. Rotterdam, 25 November 2015, C/10/474075/ HA ZA 
15-362, https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBROT:2015:8646 (Neth.); Hof 
Arnhem-Leeuwarden, 15 September 2015, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2015:6816 (Neth.), https://uitspraken 
.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:GHARL:2015:6816; Tribunale Modena, [District Court] 
19 Febbraio 2014, https://www.uncitral.org/docs/clout/ITA/ITA_190214_FT_clean.pdf (It.); IV CSK 
187/13, of November 28, 2013, of the Supreme Court of Poland, https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V16/048/61/PDF/V1604861.pdf?OpenElement; Cour de cassation [Cass.] 
[Supreme Court for Judicial Matters] 1e civ., Feb. 20, 2007, Bull. Ci. I No. 68 (Fr.), https://cisgw3.law 
.pace.edu/cases/070220f1.html; Cour de cassation [Cass.] [Supreme Court for Judicial Matters] 1e civ, 
Oct. 25, 2005, No.1388 (Fr.); Handelsgericht Zürich [HG] [Commercial Court], February 5, 1997, HG 95 
0347 (Switz.), https://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970205s1.html. 
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contracting State (e.g., “English law”), such a choice of law usually32 
prevents the forum from the possibility of applying the uniform regime.33 
It should be evident from the foregoing that the efficacy and the validity 
of the choice of law agreement might represent a gateway issue for the 
applicability of the CISG. If a scrutiny on the pactum de lege utenda needs 
to be performed by the competent court, then the question of which are the 
legal parameters to be used inevitably arises. 
In order to produce effects, a choice of law agreement needs, in the first 
place, to have been de facto agreed upon. Only a choice of law agreement 
that has been mutually consented to by the parties involved in the dispute can 
be deemed “existent.” 
Only once that “consent” as a threshold-requirement has been 
established,34 it becomes possible to determine whether the agreement 
factually reached can be considered valid.35 As is well known, this inquiry 
                                                                                                                           
 
32 For the remark that only in exceptional cases the designation of the law of a non-Contracting 
State pursues the goal of identifying the legal system to be relied upon to fill the gaps of the Convention 
see CHRISTOPH BENICKE, Article 6 CISG, in MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM HGB 788 (Karsten Schmidt 
ed., 3d ed. 2012); FRANCO FERRARI, Article 6 CISG, in KOMMENTAR ZUM EINHEITLICHEN UN-
KAUFRECHT 129 (Peter Schlechtriem & Ingeborg Schwenzer eds., 4th ed. 2004); ULRICH MAGNUS, 
Article 6 CISG, in WIENER UN-KAUFRECHT (CISG) 171 (Ulrich Magnus & Dagmar Kaiser eds., 3d ed. 
2012). 
33 See MICHAEL JOACHIM BONELL, COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW 51, 56 (C. 
Massimo Bianca & Michael Joachim Bonell eds., 1987); SERGIO MARIA CARBONE & RICCARDO 
LUZZATTO, I CONTRATTI DEL COMMERCIO INTERNAZIONALE 132 (1984); FRANCO FERRARI, LA VENDITA 
INTERNAZIONALE: APPLICABILITÀ ED APPLICAZIONI DELLA CONVENZIONE DI VIENNA, at 166; Ole 
Lando, The 1985 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Sales, 72 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 84 (1987); MARTIN F. KÖHLER, DAS UN-
KAUFRECHT (CISG) UND SEIN ANWENDUNGSAUSSCHLUSS 204 (2008). In the case law see, e.g., V CSK 
528/14, of June 25, 2015 of the Supreme Court of Poland, https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V16/048/61/PDF/V1604861.pdf?OpenElement; Oberlandesgericht [OLG] 
[Higher Regional Court for Appeals] Linz, Jan. 23 2006, 6 R 160/05z (Austria), 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/060123a3.html; Tribunale [District Court] Padova, 11 Gennaio 2005 
(It.), http://cisgw3.law. pace.edu/cases/050111i3.html; Tribunal Cantonal Jura [Appellate Court] Nov. 3, 
2004, Ap 91/104 (Switz.), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/041103s1.html; Oberlandesgericht [OLG] 
[Higher Regional Court] Düsseldorf, July 2, 1993 17 U 73/93 (Ger.), https://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/ 
930702g1.html. 
34 As has been said, “Questions of validity and scope arise only if there is an agreement on choice 
of law. Thus, the question of existence must always precede questions of validity and scope.” Flechtner 
& Brand, supra note 30, at 122. 
35 Of course, the existence and the validity of choice of law agreements are only some of the 
conditiones sine quibus non of their effectiveness. Other questions that a court may be required to deal 
with refer to the scope or to the admissibility of a choice of law agreement. Whereas the former issue is 
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may involve two profiles. The first one relates to the compliance of the choice 
of law agreement with the formal requirements possibly applicable (formal 
validity). The second one involves the verification of the “genuineness” of 
consent, or lack thereof covering issues such as fraud, mistake, duress, 
misrepresentation, or questions of capacity (material validity).36 
Well, given that the questions related to the formation of consent and 
the questions related to the form are notoriously governed by the CISG,37 it 
seems at first sight that two options are viable. The first one, based on the 
prevalence of uniform substantive law over private international law,38 would 
allow national courts to rely on the CISG rules39 on contract formation and 
on form as directly applicable to any contractual terms included in a sales 
contract. The second one, on the other hand, would require national courts to 
fall back to the private international law of the forum, as a necessary 
complementing tool to solve CISG-related transactions and problems.40 
The former approach would have the advantage of taking into 
consideration the parties’ bargain in its complexity,41 but—irrespective of the 
shortcomings that it reveals from a dogmatic point of view—is certainly to 
be held as inappropriate in the case in which the existence of a choice of law 
agreement constitutes “the factor” leading to the applicability of the CISG 
                                                                                                                           
 
left, as question of law and fact, to the wisdom of the national court involved, the latter needs to be 
addressed on the basis of the conflict of laws provisions of the lex fori. 
36 PETER NYGH, AUTONOMY IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 72 (1999). 
37 On the contrary, since material validity issues fall outside the scope of application of the 
Convention pursuant to its Article 4(a), courts should resort to a choice of law process, see Henry Mather, 
Choice of Law for International Sales Issues Not Resolved by the CISG, 20 J.L. & COM. 155, 161 (2001). 
38 See Tribunale di Vigevano [District Court], 12 Luglio 2000 n.405, Giur. It. 2000, 280 (It.), 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/000712i3.html. See also Tribunale di Rimini [District Court], 
26 Novembre 2002 (It.), https://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/021126i3.html; Tribunale di Padova [District 
Court], 25 Febbraio 2004 (It.), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040225i3.html; Tribunale di Padova 
[District Court], 31 Marzo 2004 (It.), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040331i3.html; Tribunale di 
Padova Sez. Este [District Court], 11 Gennaio 2005 (It.), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050111i3 
.html; Tribunale di Forlì [District Court], 11 Dicembre 2008 (It.), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/ 
081211i3.html; Tribunale di Forlì [District Court], 16 Febbraio 2009 (It.), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/ 
cases/090216i3.html. 
39 Martin Schmidt-Kessel, in COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL 
SALE OF GOODS 176 (Ingeborg Schwenzer ed., 4th ed. 2016). 
40 On the supplementing role of private international law approach vis-à-vis the CISG, see 
generally, Franco Ferrari, PIL and CISG: Friends of Foes?, 31 J.L. & COM. 45 (2012–2013). 
41 ICC Award No. 9651, ICC ICArb. Bull. Vol. 12/No. 2, 76 (2001), http://www.unilex.info/ 
case.cfm?id=692 (“Parties do not expect that on issues of formation and validity of the choice-of-law 
agreement, a law other than the chosen law could apply.”). 
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pursuant to Article 1(1)(b). Since what is at stake in the scenario considered 
is precisely the applicability of the CISG due to the choice of law agreement, 
it would be logically inconsistent to rely directly on provisions whose 
applicability is under dispute. Moreover, since it is precisely Article 1(1)(b) 
CISG that refers explicitly to the private international law of the forum, this 
clearly appears to be the source from which to derive the solution of the 
problem at stake. Consequently, the court seized, in a case as such the one 
considered, should apply its own private international law. 
What is more debatable is whether the same skepticism, vis-à-vis what 
one can describe as a voie directe approach, applies also when a genuine 
choice-of-law42 amounts to an implicit43 exclusion of the CISG pursuant to 
Article 6 CISG44 (as is usually45 the case when the parties have chosen the 
law of a non-Contracting State). 
As a matter of fact, it has been suggested that—when disputed—the 
issue of the formation of a choice of law agreement implicitly excluding the 
                                                                                                                           
 
42 The choice of a law as governing law (“kollisionsrechtliche Verweisung”) has to be distinguished 
by the mere incorporation of legal provisions as contractual terms (“materiellrechtliche Verweisung”). 
While the former supersedes all the provisions of the law otherwise applicable including its mandatory 
rules, the latter implies that the law chosen is incorporated in the contract by reference as any other 
contractual term and, therefore, cannot affect the application of the mandatory rules of the law otherwise 
applicable. See generally Francesca Ragno, Article 3: Freedom of Choice, in ROME I REGULATION 
POCKET COMMENTARY 73 (Franco Ferrari ed., 2014). 
43 On the possibility of an implicit exclusion of the Convention see FRANCO FERRARI & M. 
TORSELLO, INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW CISG, 42 (2d ed. 2018). In the case law see TRIB. GENÈVE 
Mar. 30, 2015 (Switz.); Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal], Rouen Oct. 3, 2013, 12/02078 (Fr.), 
https://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/131003f1.html; Corte Cubana de Arbitraje Comercial Internacional, 
Arbitral Award Sept. 2013, http://www.globalsaleslaw.org/content/api/cisg/urteile/2579.pdf; 
Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court of Cologne] Köln Apr. 24, 2013 (Ger.), 
https://dejure.org/dienste/vernetzung/rechtsprechung?Gericht=OLG%20K%F6ln&Datum=24.04.2013&
Aktenzeichen=16%20U%20106/12; Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Apr. 2, 2009, 8 Ob 
125/08b (Austria), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/090402a3.html; Tribunale Forlì [District Court], 
16 February 2009 (It.), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/090216i3.html; Foreign Trade Court of 
Arbitration attached to the Serbian Chamber of Commerce, Arbitral Award of 28 January 2009, 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/090128sb.html; Polimeles Protodikio Athinon [Multi-Member Court of 
First Instance of Athens] 4505/2009 (Greece), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/094505gr.html#ii2. 
44 See JOHN HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED 
NATIONS CONVENTION 199 (4th ed. 2009). 
45 On the need to evaluate the exclusion of the CISG on a case by case analysis see 
Oberlandesgerich [OLG] [Appellate Court] Jan. 23, 2006, OBERSTEN GERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSACHEN 
[SZ] No. 6 R 160/05z (Austria), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/060123a3.html; Tribunal Cantonal du 
Jura [Appellate Court] Nov. 3, 2004, Ap 91/04 (Switzerland), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/041103s1 
.html. 
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Convention (as the choice of law of a non-Contracting State) has to be 
governed by the CISG.46 The argument usually advanced to support this view 
is that, “until it is shown that the parties agreed to exclude the CISG pursuant 
to Article 6 of the CISG, the Convention governs.”47 It appears undeniable 
that, for the purpose of Article 6, the scrutiny on an agreement selecting the 
law of a non-Contracting State is simply aimed at verifying whether the 
parties had clearly48 intended to exclude the CISG49 in a scenario in which 
the CISG is prima facie applicable.50 However, the opting-out of the CISG 
in the case considered, cannot be detached from the question of the existence 
                                                                                                                           
 
46 See SCHMIDT-KESSEL, supra note 39, at 177; ULRICH SCHROETER, in supra note 39, at 14–24; 
INGEBORG SCHWENZER & PETER HACHEM, in supra note 39, at 103–05. Contra COMMENTARY ON THE 
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 103 (Peter Schlechtriem & Ingeborg Schwenzer eds., 2d ed. 
2005). 
47 Peter Winship, The Hague Principles, the CISG, and the “Battle of the Forms,” 4 PENN ST. J.L. 
& INTL. AFF. 151, 160 (2015–16). See also CISG-AC Opinion No. 16, Exclusion of the CISG under 
Article 6, Rapporteur: Doctor Lisa Spagnolo, Monash University, Australia. Adopted by the CISG 
Advisory Council following its 19th meeting, in Pretoria, South Africa on 30 May 2014, 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/CISG-AC-op16.html [hereinafter CISG-AC Opinion No. 16] (“The 
better view is that once a contract is prima facie governed by the CISG by virtue of Article 1, the 
adjudicator must look to its provisions alone to decide if there has been an exclusion, since until such time 
as Article 6 is satisfied, the CISG remains the governing law of the contract. It is the CISG which controls 
the ‘choice of law rule’ when a contract to which the CISG is prima facie applicable exists.”). 
48 See FERRARI, supra note 30, at 162 (2012); PETAR ŠARČEVIČ, THE 1980 UNIFORM SALES LAW 
3 (Franco Ferrari ed., 2003); JOHN HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 
1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 80–81 (3d ed. 1999) (In the sense that Article 6 CISG presupposes 
a clear indication of the parties’ intent to implicitly include the Convention.); In the case law see also 
Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court for Appeals] Linz, Jan. 23 2006, 6 R 160/05z (Austria), 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/060123a3.html; Tribunal Cantonal du Jura [Appellate Court] Nov. 3, 
2004, Ap 91/04 (Switzerland), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/041103s1.html; BP Oil Int’l v. Empresa 
Estatal Petrol (PetroEcuador), 332 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 2003). 
For the idea that an “in dubio pro Conventione approach” should prevail in case of doubts see 
CISG-AC Opinion No. 16, supra note 47, at para. 3.5. 
49 See CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, ADVANCED INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW 21 
(2016); FRANCO FERRARI & MARCO TORSELLO, INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW CISG 44 (2d ed. 2018); 
Schmidt-Kessel, supra note 39, at 104; PETER HUBER & ALLISTAR MULLIS, THE CISG—A NEW 
TEXTBOOK FOR STUDENTS AND PRACTITIONERS 63 (2007) (To determine whether the choice of a law 
agreement amounts to a purported exclusion of the CISG, resort has to be made to the rules of 
interpretation provided by Article 8 CISG.). 
Contra COMMENTARY, supra note 46, at 85 (In general on the need to refer to Article 8 for the 
purpose of determining whether the parties have intended to implicitly exclude the CISG.); see also Trib. 
Genève (Switzerland), 30 March 2015; Turfworthy, LLC v. Dr. Karl Wetekam & Co. KG, 26 F. Supp. 3d 
496 (M.D.N.C. 2014). 
50 See FERRARI, supra note 30, at 152 (For the remark that the lack of an exclusion represents a 
negative applicability requirement of the CISG.). 
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and of the validity of a genuine choice of law.51 Logically, this choice cannot 
perform any indicative role if it is not capable to produce effects52: ex nihilo 
nihil fit.53 Given that the choice of law agreement has a contractual nature54 
and is independent from the main contract to which refers (doctrine of 
severability),55 an immediate reliance on the rules of the CISG is far from 
persuasive. Automatically subjecting the issue of the formal consent on the 
choice of law agreement (or its formal validity) to the CISG as the law prima 
facie governing the main contract would disregard the fact that the choice of 
law agreement has to be distinguished from the main contract because it 
                                                                                                                           
 
51 See FRANCO FERRARI, KOMMENTAR ZUM EMHEITILICHEN UN-KAUFRECHT 129 (Peter 
Schlechtriem & Ingeborg Schwenzer eds., 4th ed. 2004); see also Schmidt-Kessel, supra note 39, at 104 
(A completely different situation arises when the court is faced with an exclusion of the CISG that does 
not operate at conflict of laws level, but only at substantive level (as is the case when the parties have 
excluded the CISG by referring to the purely domestic contract law of a Contracting State). In this case 
the CISG governs, because the opting-out agreement operates only as a contractual term.). Contra 
COMMENTARY, supra note 46, at 86. Similarly see FRANCO FERRARI, KOMMENTAR ZUM EMHEITILICHEN 
UN-KAUFRECHT 126 (Peter Schlechtriem & Ingeborg Schwenzer eds., 4th ed. 2004). 
52 See BENICKE, supra note 32 (Clearly, no actual intention of these parties can be deduced from 
an agreement that is not existent, nor valid.). 
53 But see Winship, supra note 47, at 162–63 (2015–16) (“Sellers and buyers will rarely agree to 
exclude the CISG without designating the law applicable instead. Somewhat more likely is a transaction 
where Party A and Party B negotiate a term excluding the CISG and a separate term that designates the 
law of State Z, a non-CISG State, as the applicable law. The judge in this case must answer two questions: 
Did the parties agree to exclude the CISG? And, did the parties effectively choose the law of State Z?. . . . 
The judge should analyze the first of these questions in light of the CISG’s general principles on the 
formation of an enforceable agreement. That the parties purport to choose the law of State Z as the 
applicable law is some evidence of their intent to exclude the CISG. Whether or not their choice of State 
Z’s law is valid is a separate question. If the judge concludes that the parties agreed to exclude the CISG, 
the judge must then determine whether rules of private international law would give effect to the parties’ 
choice of the law of State Z.”). See also Schmidt-Kessel, supra note 39, at 103 (“The formation and the 
interpretation of the exclusion of the CISG is subject to the rules of the Convention, as the CISG 
determines its sphere of application autonomously. This includes the situation in which the choice of law 
clause contained in standard terms is disputed between the parties. Whether the parties have also managed 
to enter the law of a certain State is to be decided by rules designated by the applicable conflict of laws 
rules of the forum or arbitration rules respectively” (emphasis added).). 
54 See FRANCO FERRARI, INTERNATIONALES VERTRAGSRECHT (Franco Ferrari et al. eds., 3d ed. 
2018). 
55 Dietmar Czernich, Die Rechtswahl im österreichischen internationalen Vertragsrecht, ZfRV—
Zeitschrift für Europarecht, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT UND RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG 157, 161 
(2013); JAN VON HEIN, EUROPÄISCHES ZIVILPROZESS—UND KOLLISIONSRECHT (Thomas Rauscher ed., 
4th ed. 2016); Daniel Girsberger & Neil B. Cohen, Key Features of the Hague Principles on Choice of 
Law in International Commercial Contracts, 22 UNIFORM L. REV. 316, 324 (2017); HHCH, supra note 
22, at art. 7 (As a consequence, a genuine choice of law (“kollisionsrechtliche Verweisung”) can be 
effective even when the contract to which it applies is null and void or vitiated, for example, by fraud or 
misrepresentation.). 
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pursues an autonomous, typical and unequivocal goal;56 the determination of 
the applicable law.57 In the light of the deference that one has to pay to choice 
of law agreements as the epiphany of the triumph of party autonomy in 
international commerce,58 for the purpose of Article 6 it is here suggested 
that, where disputed, the efficacy and validity of a choice of law agreement 
designating a non-Contracting State should be evaluated by referring to the 
private international law of the forum59 and not—tout court—to the CISG as 
the substantive law governing the main contract.60 
                                                                                                                           
 
56 Andrew Dickinson, A Note on the Autonomy of the Parties’ Agreement on Choice of Law (Sydney 
Law School Research Paper No. 12/83, 2011), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2168058 (As has been said, 
separating “the process of determining the parties’ consent to the law chosen and the parties’ consent to 
the contract itself would appear to be theoretically, logically and practically desirable, and indeed 
necessary. It acknowledges the separate nature and function of rules of private international law and the 
need for a court or tribunal to identify as a preliminary question a system of law by reference to which the 
existence and validity of the parties contract must be tested.”). 
57 See MARIA HOOK, THE CHOICE OF LAW CONTRACT 13 (2016) (“[T]he choice of law contract is 
not only a connecting factor, because it designates the law applicable pursuant to the party autonomy rule, 
but also an object of connection, because it is itself an international contract whose existence and validity 
must be determined. . . . It is independent from any underlying relationship to which the chosen law is 
applied, because the sole function of the choice of law contract is to opt out of the applicable objective 
choice of law rule and select the law governing the underlying relationship. . . . As an independent 
contract, the choice of law contract must have its own applicable law . . . but in addition, it must be 
regulated by rules that are specific to the choice of law contract—by ‘modal choice of law rules’. . . .”). 
58 FERRARI & TORSELLO, supra note 49, at 41. 
59 FERRARI, supra note 32, at 129, para. 20; FERRARI, in supra note 51, at 85 para. 7 (“A derogation 
clause nominating the law of a non-contracting State is a choice of law clause governed by the rules of 
private international law (conflict of laws) of the forum. Even if the issue arises before a court of a 
Contracting State, the forum’s conflict of law rules govern this choice of law agreement (and determine 
the law applicable to its), its prerequisites and validity.”). In the same vein see also Peter Mankowski, in 
COMMERCIAL LAW: ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE COMMENTARY 35, para. 6 (Peter Mankowski ed., 2019) 
(commenting on Article 6 CISG); KÖHLER, supra note 33, at 204–05; HUBER & MULLIS, supra note 49, 
at 61. 
60 Peter Mankowski, Commentary: Rome I Regulations, in EUROPEAN COMMENTARIES ON 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, para. 431, at 243 (Peter Mankowski & Ulrich Magnus eds. 2017) 
(commenting on art. 3 Rome I) (“Choice of law agreement and main contract are two different issues 
regardless whether formally the former appears as clause X in a uniform document and might convey the 
impression to be one of the consecutive issues of the main contract. There might not be a ‘make or fail’ 
approach if the choice of law agreement is added with the help of a Standard Term or that, conversely, 
the parties first negotiated which law shall be applicable and made this the integrative basis for their 
contract. Neither constellation makes the choice of law agreement and the main contract intertwine with 
each other to such an extent that they could not be extricated and separated from one another.”). For this 
approach, in relation to a question related to the existence and the validity of a choice of court agreement, 
see BGH, Mar. 25, 2015, VIII ZR 125/14, http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgi-bin/rechtsprechung  
/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=en&nr=71114&pos=0&anz=1. 
 
2019-2020] THE CISG AND THE CHOICE OF LAW 257 
 
Vol. 38 (2019-2020) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2020.188 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
III. THE COMPLEMENTING ROLE OF THE PIL: THE SOLUTIONS PROVIDED 
BY THE ROME I REGULATION 
1. The conclusions drawn above show that the private international 
law of the forum is the source to examine when scrutinizing a 
genuine choice of law agreement as a gateway issue for the 
applicability of the CISG. As is well known, this source is largely 
uniform in the EU and must be identified in the Rome I 
Regulation.61 This instrument offers modal choice of law rules62 
precisely aimed at addressing the issues of the existence and 
validity of a choice of law agreement. 
As can be inferred from Article 3(5), the Rome I Regulation clearly 
recognizes the severability of a choice of law agreement.63 Despite that, 
however, the Regulation (like the Rome Convention) creates a vicious 
circle.64 It provides that the existence and material validity of the consent of 
the parties, as to the choice, has to be ascertained on the basis of the same 
law which governs the consent and the material validity of the main 
                                                                                                                           
 
61 The Rome I Regulation replaced the 1980 Rome Convention and became applicable in all EU 
Member States (except Denmark) as the instrument dealing with the problem of the law applicable to 
contracts concluded after December 17, 2009. However, since Commission Regulation 593/2008 (Rome 
I), art. 25, 2008 J.O. (L 177) (EC) establishes the continuing validity of “international conventions to 
which one or more Member States are parties at the time when this Regulation is adopted and which lay 
down conflict-of-law rules relating to contractual obligations,” in some EU Member States (as Italy and 
France) the choice-of-laws rules to be applied to international sales contracts are to be found in the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law [HCCH], 1955 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to 
International Sales of Goods (June 15, 1955). 
62 For the concept of modal choice of law rules see Maria Hook, The Concept of Modal Choice of 
Law Rules, 11 J. PRIV. INT’L L. 185, 185 (2015) (“[M]odal choice of law rules are rules of choice of law 
that supplement the operation of choice of law rules. For example, a rule that requires a choice of law 
agreement to be in writing is a modal choice of law rule, because it supplements the choice of law rule 
that contracts be governed by the law the parties intended to apply.”). 
63 This principle is further acknowledged in the LDIP, supra note 18, at art. 116(2) and the HCCH, 
Principles on Choice of Law in International Contracts, supra note 22, at art. 7. 
64 For critical remarks see Harry M. Flechtner & Ronald A. Brand, Opting In to the CISG: Avoiding 
the Redline Products Problems, in A TRIBUTE TO JOSEPH M. LOOKOFSKY 95, 123 (Mads Bryde Andersen 
& René Franz Henschel eds., 2015) (“this rule both exhibits circular logic and risks the misuse of 
overweening bargaining power by a party that unilaterally imposes a choice of law clause and then 
effectively prevents the other party from arguing lack of consent by reference to the law that would 
otherwise apply to the question of party consent”). 
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contract,65 namely, by the law that would apply if the choice of law were 
valid.66 It follows that, if the law putatively chosen were the law of a CISG 
non-Contracting State, the existence of the choice of law agreement would 
need to be verified on the basis of the general contract law rules of the non-
Contracting State. 
On the other hand, if the law putatively chosen were the law of a CISG 
Contracting State (such as “Italian law”), the issue of the external consent of 
the parties on the governing law would be tested on the basis of the CISG 
rules on contract formation, as the CISG is part of the legal system chosen 
by the parties.67 On the contrary, the issues related to the material validity of 
the agreement would be solved according to the domestic internal law of the 
Contracting State whose legal system has been chosen. As far as the 
relevance of the CISG, it is certainly true that the purpose of the uniform 
regime is not to set forth rules governing a choice of law agreement, but only 
to govern “the formation of the contract of sale and the rights and obligations 
of the seller and the buyer arising from such a contract” (Article 4 CISG).68 
                                                                                                                           
 
65 See Rome I, supra note 19, at art. 3(5); see also Rome I, supra note 19, at art. 8. The same 
solution is also provided in HCCH, 1955 Convention on the Law Applicable to Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods, art. 2 (June 15, 1955). The same solution is embraced in HCCH, Principles 
on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts, supra note 22, at art. 6, and in HCCH, 1986 
Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, supra note 15, 
at art. 10(1). In the case law on the Rome Convention see Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of 
Justice] Feb. 2, 1994, VII ZR 262/92 (Ger.); Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Nov. 24, 
1988, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 1431, 1432 1989 (Ger.); Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] 
[Federal Court of Justice] Dec. 15, 1986, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 1145, 1987 (Ger.). 
66 The same solution is embraced in HCCH, Principles on Choice of Law in International Law, 
supra note 22, at art. 6 and in the HCCH, 1986 Hague Convention on the Law in Applicable to Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods, supra note 15, at art. 10(1). In the case law on the Rome Convention 
see Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Feb. 2, 1994, VIII ZR 262/92 (Ger.); 
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Nov. 24, 1988, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 
[NJW] 1431, 1432, 1989 (Ger.); Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Dec. 15, 1986, 
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 1145, 1987 (Ger.). 
67 In the case law see, inter alia Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] July 23, 1997, 
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 3309, 1997 (Ger). Of course, this situation does not occur 
when the law chosen is the law of a CISG Contracting State that has made a reservation under Article 92. 
68 Thomas Kadner Graziano, Solving the Riddle of Conflicting Choice of Law Clauses in Battle of 
Forms Situations: The Hague Solution, 14 Y.B PRIV. INT’L L. 71, 96 (2013). For similar remarks see 
Mankowski, supra note 59, at 61 (2007) (“it is submitted that there are good grounds to assume that the 
formation provisions of the CISG (Article 14 et seq. CISG) are only aimed at the formation of sales 
contract, and do not extend to other agreements that may be concluded on the occasion of a sales contract 
(such a choice of law or a forum selection). In fact, the requirements set up in Article 14(1) CISG (. . .) 
clearly refer to a classic sales contract. It is true that Article 19(3) CISG mentions clauses concerning 
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This truism, however, does not preclude that the substantive rules of Part II 
of the CISG might, cum grano salis, be extended also to address a separate 
agreement—the pactum de lege utenda. Not only does Part II of the CISG 
address matters of general contract formation that are not specific to 
international sales contracts,69 but also addresses a unitary approach vis-à-vis 
the choice of law agreement. The main contract is precisely what is 
prescribed for by a specific modal choice of rule of the law of the forum.70 It 
is the Rome I Regulation that promotes the so called “bootstrap principle” 
and this represents the acknowledgment rather than the dilution of the 
aforementioned principle of severability.71 
The circular approach provided by Article 3(5) Rome I Regulation 
applies also when the choice of law agreement is contained in the standard 
terms of one of the parties.72 Since the CISG governs the question of whether 
standard contract terms are incorporated into an international sales contract,73 
the question is to be solved according to Article 14 read in conjunction with 
Article 8. 
Difficult problems, however, arise when the parties’ standard terms 
contain conflicting choice of law clauses (the “battle of the forms”). In this 
author’s opinion, Article 3(5) of the Rome I Regulation does not address this 
scenario;74 in this respect, the Rome I Regulation seems to present a gap that, 
arguably, could be filled by relying on the Hague Principles, which devotes 
a specific rule on the matter. As the Hague Principles are intended to provide 
                                                                                                                           
 
dispute resolution mechanism, but this reference does not necessarily presuppose that the formation of 
such clauses—which are generally regarded to be separate contracts from the contract of sale—is 
governed by Article 14 et seq. CISG; it simply says that they are so important that the insertion or 
modification of such a (separate) clause or contract during the negotiation process may also affect the 
conclusion of the sales contract. As a result, the formation rules of the CISG should be regarded as not 
covering the formation of choice of law clauses (or forum selection clauses).”). 
69 FRANCO FERRARI & MARCUS TORSELLO, INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW CISG 173 (2d ed. 2018) 
(As it has been noted, moreover, “the CISG does not only address issues specific to the type of contract it 
governs, namely that for the international sale of goods, but it also addresses matters of a more general 
nature.”). 
70 Mankowski, supra note 60, at para. 431, at 243 (commenting on art. 3 Rome I). 
71 Id. 
72 CALLIESS, supra note 19, at para. 28 (commenting on art. 3 Rome I); ULRICH MAGNUS, in J. VON 
STAUDINGERS KOMMENTAR ZUM BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH: STAUDINGER BGB—EGBGB/IPR 
EINFÜHRUNGSGESETZ ZUM BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHE/IPR, para. 167 (Ulrich Magnus ed., 2016) 
(commenting on art. 3 Rome I). 
73 See Mankowski, supra note 59, at 35, para. 6 (commenting on art. 14 CISG). 
74 For a similar conclusion see Graziano, supra note 68, at 80. 
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a type of codification of “best practices with respect to choice of law in 
international commercial contracts, as recognized [sic] at an international 
level,”75 it is here submitted that they might be relied upon by a court sitting 
in a EU Member State as a supplementing tool to be used in the presence of 
ambiguities or gaps of the Rome I Regulation regime.76 
The vexed problem of the battle of the forms is expressly dealt with by 
Article 6(1)(b) Hague Principles. According to this provision: 
if the parties have used standard terms designating two different laws and under 
both of these laws the same standard terms prevail, the law designated in the 
prevailing terms applies; if under these laws different standard terms prevail, or if 
under one or both of these laws no standard terms prevail, there is no choice of 
law.77 
Although the proposed solution may appear simple, its application in 
practice may prove much more complex. In the event that the issue of 
conflicting terms was raised before a national court, the identification of the 
solution provided by the chosen law with regard to the “battle of the forms” 
could be troublesome. Legal systems do not always provide for a clear and 
univocal solution to the battle of form issue, thus making it complicated to 
identify the “prevailing” law according to the system considered.78 
Notwithstanding the aforementioned difficulties that the application of 
the rule under examination may trigger,79 the solution endorsed by the Hague 
Principles is to be welcomed.80 The novel approach puts an end to the 
                                                                                                                           
 
75 HCCH, Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts, supra note 22, at 
pmbl. at ¶ 2. 
76 As it emerges from the Preamble, the Hague Principles have a multi-faceted functionality of the 
Principles. They aim not only at being a “model for national, regional, supranational or international 
instruments,” but also a means “to interpret, supplement and develop rules of private international law.” 
On the possible gap-filling role to be performed by the Hague Principles see Basedow, supra note 22, at 
308–11. 
77 HCCH, Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts, supra note 22, at 
art. 6(1)(b). 
78 Ole Lando, The Draft Hague Principles on the choice of law in international contracts and Rome 
I, in A COMMITMENT TO PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HANS VAN LOON 299, 
309 (Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference On Private Int’l Law ed. 2013); Dieter Martiny, Die 
Haager Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contract—Eine weitere Verankerung 
der Parteiautonomie, 79 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES 
PRIVATRECHT 624, 643 (2015). 
79 Schwartze, supra note 22, at 98. 
80 Thomas Kadner Graziano, The Hague Solution on Choice-of Law Clauses in Conflicting 
Standard Terms, 22 UNIF. L. REV. 351, 355 (2017); Thomas Pfeiffer, Die Haager Prinzipien des 
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uncertainty regarding the approaches to be employed in battle of form 
scenarios.81 Moreover, the alternative solution, consisting in denying tout 
court any effect to divergent choice of law clauses inserted in standard terms 
(by promoting a knock-out rule at the conflict of laws level82), seems too 
radical and hard to reconcile with the need to take into consideration the 
expectations of the parties.83 
Having introduced the mechanism provided by the Hague Principles, it 
is now the time to test it in relation to a hypothetical situation in which 
colliding choice of law agreements have been exchanged in the context of 
the negotiation of an international sales contract. Let us suppose that, due to 
an exclusive choice of court agreement selecting the Spanish courts, the court 
of Madrid is chosen in relation to an international sale dispute between a 
company seated in Germany and a company seated in England. Since the 
CISG is not directly applicable pursuant to Article 1(1)(a), the court is 
required to verify whether the law applicable to the contract under the Rome 
I Regulation is the law of a CISG Contracting State. Let us further assume 
that, in the case at stake, the English Offeror/Seller issued a quotation (to be 
classified as an offer pursuant to Article 14 CISG), with attached standard 
terms, including a clause designating English law as the law governing the 
contract. German Offeree/Buyer, on its part, issued a purchase order which 
incorporated her standard terms, including a choice of German law as the law 
applicable to the contract. Offeror performed her contractual obligations. If 
the Spanish court were to apply the Hague Principles, the analysis would 
require a comparison of the approach taken by the German law vis-à-vis the 
problem of the “battle of the forms” and the solution provided by English 
law. In this respect, a preliminary question would need to be addressed: is 
                                                                                                                           
 
internationalen Vertragsrechts—Ausgewa¨hlte Aspekte aus der Sicht der Rom I-VO, in Parteiautonomie 
im IPR—Allgemeines Anknüpfungsprinzip oder Verlegenheitslösung, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR ULRICH 
MAGNUS 501, 507 (Peter Mankowski & Wolfgang Wurmnest eds., 2014); Francesca Ragno, I Principi 
dell’Aja sulla scelta della legge applicabile ai contratti commerciali internazionali: mero esercizio di 
stile o strumento utile in ambito europeo?, 22 CONTRATTO E IMPRESA/EUROPA 320, 352 (2017). 
81 For the different approaches that have been endorsed see Graziano, supra note 68. On the 
problem see also Anatol Dutta, Kollidierende Rechtswahlklauseln in allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen: 
ein Beitrag zur Bestimmung des Rechtswahlstatuts, 104 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR VERGLEICHENDE 
RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 461 (2005); Lisa Möll, Kollidierende Rechtswahlklauseln in Allgemeinen 
Geschäftsbedingungen im Internationalen Vertragsrecht (Peter Lang ed., 2012). 
82 Lando, supra note 78; MAGNUS, supra note 72, at para. 174. 
83 Graziano, supra note 80, at 360. 
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the reference to German law to be intended as German law comprising the 
CISG or as referring just to the purely domestic German contract law? In 
order to understand the significance of this preliminary issue, let us consider 
the latter possibility first. As a result of the fact that (the purely domestic) 
German law provides for a knock-out rule, whereas English law provides for 
the last-shot rule, the case under consideration would present a true conflict 
situation under Article 6(1)(b) of the Hague Principles. Since one of the 
designated laws (German law) applies a knock-out rule, “no standard terms 
would prevail,”84 and no choice of law would be deemed to exist. It follows 
that the court would be required to identify the applicable law for the purpose 
of Article 1(1)(b) pursuant to the objectively connecting factor provided by 
Article 4 Rome I Regulation. This would likely lead to the designation of 
English law, as it is the law of the habitual residence of the seller. As a 
consequence, the CISG would not be applicable. 
A (possibly) different conclusion would be drawn if the court were to 
apply the CISG. Given the absence of a black letter rule in the CISG devoted 
to solving the issue of the battle of the forms, a plethora of different theories 
have been proposed in the legal literature and in the case law.85 In this 
author’s view, the preferable opinion is that the issue of the “battle of forms” 
needs to be solved on the basis of the mirror-image rule provided in Article 
19 CISG.86 If the offeree replies to an offer containing standard contract 
terms that form part of the offer by sending an acceptance that also contains 
standard contract terms, one must ascertain whether the reply contains 
additional or different terms that materially alter the offer (Article 19(2)).87 
Since there is no doubt that a choice of law agreement is to be considered as 
a material alteration of the offer,88 the reply of the offeree represents a new 
                                                                                                                           
 
84 HCCH, Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts, supra note 22, at 
art. 6(1)(b). 
85 On the issue see Bruno Zeller, The CISG and the Battle of the Forms, in INTERNATIONAL SALES 
LAW—A GLOBAL CHALLENGE 203 (Larry A. Di Matteo ed., 2014). 
86 FERRARI & TORSELLO, supra note 69, at 201. 
87 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, art. 
19(2), S. Treaty Doc. 98-9, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3. 
88 In the legal doctrine see Franco Ferrari, in UN-CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES OF 
GOODS (CISG): A COMMENTARY, para. 11, at 272 (Stefan Kröll et al. eds., 2d ed. 2018) (commenting on 
art. 19 CISG); MAGNUS, supra note 72 (commenting on art. 9 CISG). In the case law see 
Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Appellate Court] 6 R 200/04f (Austria), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/ 
050323a3.html; Rechtbank van Koophandel te Hasselt [Kh.] [commerce tribunal], May 2, 1995, AR 
1849/94. 
2019-2020] THE CISG AND THE CHOICE OF LAW 263 
 
Vol. 38 (2019-2020) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2020.188 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
offer which is deemed to be accepted if the contract is performed by the 
offeror (the last-shot rule). If one accepts this conceptualization, it follows 
that in the aforementioned case the law winning the battle would be German 
law. As both the CISG and English law enforce the last shot rule in battle of 
forms cases, under Article 6(1) b), the choice of law clause agreed upon 
would be deemed the choice of German law. As a consequence, the Spanish 
court would apply the CISG pursuant to Article 1(1)(b). 
Despite the controversy surrounding the issue, in this author’s opinion, 
the preliminary question concerning the possibility of referring to the CISG 
to address the “battle of forms” dilemma in a private international law context 
should be answered in the affirmative. As elaborated above, the Convention 
not only forms part of the legal system of the Contracting State chosen, but 
also provides also a contractual regime that can be relied upon vis-à-vis 
choice of law agreements. 
With that said, it should be noted that, under the Rome I Regulation, the 
existence (but not the validity)89 of the choice of law agreement may be 
determined by the law of the country of habitual residence of the party 
denying such a choice. This can be done if it appears from the circumstances 
that it would not be reasonable to determine the effect of his conduct in 
accordance with the law specified in Article 10(1),90 which possibly could be 
the CISG. It appears thus possible that a choice of law agreement deemed to 
be existent under the CISG could be considered non-existent according to the 
law of the non-Contracting State where the opposing party resides. 
As for the formal validity of a choice of law agreement, the Rome I 
Regulation provides a regulatory framework which acknowledges that, in 
light of the above mentioned principle of severability, the formal validity of 
a choice of law agreement does not depend on the formal validity of the main 
                                                                                                                           
 
89 FERRARI, supra note 54, at para. 9 (commenting on art. 3 Rome I); Lawrence Collins, DICEY, 
MORRIS, COLLINS ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS, para. 32, at 114 (C.G.J. Morse et al. eds., 15th ed. 2012). 
90 On the relevance of this provision in relation to the so called “Schweigen auf ein kaufmännisches 
Bestätigungsschreiben” see VON HEIN, supra note 55, at para. 41 (commenting on art. 3 Rome I). For a 
similar provision see the HCCH, 1986 Convention on the Law Applicable to Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods, supra note 15, at art. 10(3). 
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contract91 and needs to be addressed separately from the main contract.92 
Article 3(5) Rome I Regulation refers to Article 11 Rome Regulation, which 
provides for the alternative application of the lex causae (and thus the chosen 
law)93 or the lex loci actus. If the choice of law agreement complies with the 
formal requirements that one of these two laws establish, possible defects of 
form according to the other of the aforementioned laws are irrelevant.94 It 
follows that, if the lex causae or the lex loci actus is the law of a EU Member 
State bound by the Rome I Regulation, no form requirement has to be met 
for a choice of law agreement to be valid. Article 3(1), indeed, does not 
require the choice of law to be expressed in writing. Due to the primacy of 
EU law,95 this principle prevails over any conflicting approach possibly 
embraced in the residual domestic legislation.96 
IV. TACIT CHOICE OF LAW 
Having underlined the role to be recognized to the private international 
law of the forum in respect to a possible scrutiny on a choice of law 
agreement as a factor leading to the applicability or exclusion of the CISG, it 
should be borne in mind that pursuant to the Rome I Regulation, choice of 
law agreements do not need to be expressed. This implies that, for the 
purpose of Article 1(1)(b) and Article 6 CISG, a choice of law (selecting the 
law of a Contract State or the law of a non-Contracting State) might be 
inferred by a national court seated in a EU Member State bound by the Rome 
                                                                                                                           
 
91 Ferrari, supra note 88, at para. 11. In the case law on the Rome Convention see BGH, BGHZ 78, 
391, 394 (Ger.): Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Nov. 6, 1980, NEUE JURISTISCHE 
WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 391, 394, 1981 (Ger.), https://dejure.org/dienste/vernetzung/rechtsprechung 
?Gericht=BGH&Datum=06.11.1980&Aktenzeichen=VII%20ZR%2047/80; Oberlandesgericht (OLG) 
Nürnberg Feb. 22, 1996, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW-RR], 1484, 1484–85, 1997 (Ger.); 
OLG Celle, EWiR 2001, 1051 (Ger.). 
92 MAGNUS, supra note 72, at para. 179. 
93 Id. 
94 When, however, the choice of law agreement concerns a consumer contract covered by 
Commission Regulation 593/2008 (Rome I), art. 6, 2008 J.O. (L 177) (EC), the questions related to the 
form of the choice have to be solved according to the law of the consumer’s habitual residence. 
95 CALLIESS, supra note 19, at para. 30. 
96 See Michael Bogdan, The Rome I Regulation on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations 
and the Choice of Law by the Parties, NEDERLANDS INTERNATIONAAL PRIVAATRECHT 407, 410 (2009); 
Anna Gardella, Regolamento CE n. 593/2008 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio del 17 giugno 2008 
sulla legge applicabile alle obbligazioni contrattuali (Roma I), 32 NUOVE LEGGI CIVILI COMMENTATE 
612, 629 (Francesca Salerno & Pietro Franzina eds., 2009). 
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I Regulation.97 According to the EU regime, as a matter of fact, parties are 
permitted to choose the applicable law implicitly, without expressly 
indicating the law chosen, as long as the tacit choice constitutes a real, rather 
than a hypothetical, choice.98 The party asserting that there has been a choice 
of law has the burden of proof.99 However, while the Rome Convention 
required an implied choice of law to be demonstrated “with a reasonable 
degree of certainty” from the terms of the contract and the surrounding 
circumstances, the Rome I Regulation demands the court to infer an implied 
choice when “clearly demonstrated”100 by the terms of the contract or101 the 
circumstances of the case102 (including, of course, the conduct of the 
parties103 and the pre-contractual104 negotiations). The substitution of the 
words “reasonable certainty” by the words “clearly demonstrated” 
introduced a stricter test that seems to aim, on one hand, to eliminate the 
                                                                                                                           
 
97 On the relevance of a tacit choice of law for the purpose of Article 1(1)(b) and Article 6 CISG, 
see MAGNUS, supra note 32, at art. 1, 92, para. 104; PETER SCHLECHTRIEM, COMMENTARY ON THE UN 
CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG), art. 1, para. 38 (Peter Schlechtriem & 
Ingeborg Schwenzer eds., 2d ed. 2005); HONNOLD, supra note 48, at 80–81 (3d ed. 1999); LOUKIS A. 
MISTELIS, UN-CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES OF GOODS (CISG), art. 6, 85, para. 12 
(Stefan M. Kröll, Loukis A. Mistelis & Pilar Perales Viscasillas eds., 2d ed. 2019). 
98 Thus, the theory of the hypothetical choice of law, under which a judge can ascertain which law 
the parties would have chosen if they had considered the issue, is not admissible. See generally Giuditta 
Cordero Moss, Tacit Choice of Law, Partial Choice and Closest Connection: The Case of Common Law 
Contract Models Governed by a Civilian Law, in RELT OG TOLERANSE FESTSKRIFT TIL HELGE JOHAN 
THUE 367, 374 (Johan Giertsen, Torstein Frantzen & Giuditta Cordero Moss eds., Festskrift Thue 2007). 
99 ALEX MILLS, PARTY AUTONOMY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 327 (2018). For case law, 
see Lawlor v. Sandvik Mining and Construction Mobile Crushers and Screens Ltd. [2012] EWHC (Civ) 
1188 (QB). 
100 See also HCCH, 1986 Convention on the Law Applicable to Contracts for the International Sale 
of Goods, supra note 15, at art. 7(1). 
101 See on the Rome Convention, Marubeni Hong Kong and South China Ltd. v. Mongolian 
Government [2002] EWHC (Comm) 873 (Despite the use of the word “or”, it is submitted that, in 
ascertaining the will of the parties, regard has been made both to the terms of the contract and to the 
circumstances of the case.). 
102 Aeolian Shipping SA v. ISS Machinery Services Limited [2001] EWCA (Civ) 1162 (As stated 
in the case law referring to the Rome Convention “the circumstances which may be taken into account 
when deciding whether or not the parties have made an implied choice of law under Article 3 of the Rome 
Convention (whether by initial choice or subsequent change) range more widely in certain respects than 
the considerations ordinarily applicable to the implication of a term into a written agreement, in particular 
by reason of the reference in Art 3(1) to ‘the circumstances of the case.’”). 
103 vON HEIN, supra note 55, at 126, art. 3, para. 36; MAGNUS, supra note 72, art. 3, para. 82. 
104 See Aeolian Shipping SA v. ISS Machinery Services Limited [2001] EWCA (Civ) 1162. 
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ambiguity linked to the expression “reasonable”105 and, on the other hand, to 
discourage courts from too easily avoiding the application of a foreign law 
on the basis of an “assumed” designation of the law of the forum.106 This 
trend of “favor legis fori,” which amounts basically to a variation of the 
homeward trend,107 is particularly evident in some jurisdictions, where 
national courts have sometimes inferred tout court a choice of lex fori from 
the fact that the parties have argued their case entirely on the basis of this law 
(even though they had not expressly agreed on its applicability).108 Since 
Article 3(1) does not authorize the court seized with the matter “to infer a 
choice of law that the parties might have made where they had no clear 
intention of making a choice,”109 the afore-described approach seems highly 
questionable, as it legitimatizes purported choices that do not reflect the true 
will of the parties.110 Moreover, it runs counter the effet utile of the default 
rules laid down in Rome I Regulation. When the party asserting a tacit choice 
cannot satisfy the court, then resort has to be made to the objective test under 
Article 4. 
As affirmed in the case law,111 
in view of the potential difficulty in drawing a line between inferring an 
unexpressed intention and imputing an intention, the test whether an implied 
choice of law has been established is objective (. . .) The objective nature of the 
                                                                                                                           
 
105 Ole Lando & Peter A. Nielsen, The Rome I Regulation, 45 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1687, 1698 
(2008). 
106 Bogdan, supra note 96, at 408; DIETER MARTINY, NEUANFANG IM EUROPÄISCHEN 
INTERNATIONALEN VERTRAGSRECHT MIT DER ROM-I-VERORDNUNG, 747, 756 (Zeitschrift für 
Europäisches Privatrecht 2010); Thomas Pfeiffer, Neues Internationales Vertragsrecht, 19 EUROPÄISCHE 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 622, 624 (2008). 
107 See FRANCO FERRARI, HOMEWARD TREND: WHAT, WHY AND WHY NOT 171, 184 (Andre 
Janssen & Olaf Meyer eds., 2009). 
108 For Germany, see OLG München, IMRRS 2017, 0137; BGH, BKR 2003, 593, 596; 
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] April 23, 2002, NEU JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 
[NJW-RR], 1359, 1361, 2002 (Ger.); Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Dec. 12, 1990, 
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 1292, 1293 1991 (Ger.); Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal 
Court of Justice] Jan. 15, 1986, NEUE JURISTISCHIE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW-RR] 456, 457, 1986 (Ger.); 
BGH, NJW-RR 1988, 159 160. For the Netherlands, see R.B. Rotterdam, 08.02.2012, <Rechtspraak.nl>; 
Hof´s-Hertogenbosch, NIPR 2001, 446 et seq.; Hof Amsterdam, NIPR 2001, 328 et seq.; R.B. Rotterdam 
NIPR 2001, 243 et seq.; RB Utrecht, NIPR 2000, 237 et seq. 
109 See Mario Giuliano & Paul Lagarde, Report on the Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Contractual Obligations, 282 OFFICIAL J. EUR. CMTYS. 1, 17 (1980). 
110 See generally VILLANI, supra note 9, at 69. 
111 Lawlor v. Sandvik Mining and Construction Mobile Crushers and Screens Ltd. [2013] EWCA 
(Civ) 365. 
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test means that the party asserting an implied choice of law has to satisfy the court 
to the required standard that, on an objective view, the parties must have taken it 
without saying that their contract should be governed by that law (. . .). He does 
not have to prove that there was in fact a subjective conscious choice (. . .), but he 
does have to satisfy the court that the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from 
the circumstances is that the parties should be taken to have intended the putative 
law to apply.112 
Provided that a court must in any case ascertain a real rather than an 
imputed intention and every element needs to be carefully considered in the 
light of the whole contractual terms and of the circumstances of the case, 
there are factors which are normally held as indicating a tacit choice of law. 
Some of these indicators, which are not to be perceived as conclusive or as 
giving rise to presumptions,113 have been mentioned in the Report on the 
Rome Convention.114 One of the strongest indications of a tacit choice of law 
is a jurisdiction agreement,115 at least when the parties have agreed on the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the forum prorogatum.116 Before the entry in force 
of the Rome Convention, courts quite often have assumed that the choice of 
forum suggests the choice of the substantive law of the forum.117 At first, the 
maxim qui eligit iudicem, eligit ius has even been incorporated into the 
Commission’s Proposal in the form of a presumption, according to which 
“the parties have agreed to confer jurisdiction on one or more courts or 
                                                                                                                           
 
112 For the idea that the existence of a tacit choice of law should be established on the basis of the 
law putatively chosen, see Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] May 1, 2015, 8 Ob. 98/14s, 
https://rdb.manz.at/document/rdb.tso.ENzfrvls2015030704?execution=e1s3&highlight=+ZfRV%E2%8
0%91LS+2015%2F39. 
113 C.M.V. CLARKSON & JONATHAN HILL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 217 (4th ed. 2011); NYGH, 
supra note 36, at 114–15. 
114 See Giuliano & Lagarde, supra note 109, at 28. 
115 See id. at 17 (“in some cases the choice of a particular forum may show in no uncertain manner 
that the parties intend the contract to be governed by the law of that forum, but this must always be subject 
to the other terms of the contract and all the circumstances of the case”). For the remark that a jurisdiction 
agreement can be considered indicative even when it is not concretely effective, see Hoge Raad der 
Nederlanden (HR) Aug. 10, 2010, NIPR 310, ECLI:NL:PHR:2010:BN1405, https://uitspraken 
.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:PHR:2010:BN1405 (Ger.). 
116 DIETER MARTINY, MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH: BGB BAND 
10: IPR, ROM I-VO, ROM II-VO, ROM III-VO, EUUNTHVO, EUERBVO, art. 1-24 EGBGB, art. 3, para. 
50 (Jan von Hein et al. eds., 7th ed. 2018). 
117 See generally Marubeni Hong Kong and South China Ltd. v. Mongolian Government [2002] 
EWHC (Comm) (Comm) 873; Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] May 5, 1993, NEUE 
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 1445, 1446 1993 (Ger.); BGH (Germany), NJW 1991, 1420, 1420; 
Hellenic Steel Co. and Others v. Svolamar Shipping Co. Ltd. and Others, 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 370 (1991). 
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tribunals of a Member State to hear and determine disputes that have arisen 
or may arise out of the contract, they shall also be presumed to have chosen 
the law of that Member State.”118 However, the approach taken by the 
Commission drew widespread criticism119 and was rejected during the 
negotiations.120 
As a result, for the purpose of the Rome I Regulation only,121 an 
exclusive (Member State) forum selection clause appears to be just one of 
the factors that a judge may take into account in determining whether a choice 
of law is clearly demonstrated (Recital no. 12 Rome I). It follows that an 
electio fori is a strong indicator of a tacit choice but may be overridden by 
others.122 
The rejection of the idea that the choice of a given jurisdiction 
automatically embodies the choice of the law of the forum prorogated can be 
shared. While that assumption bears some practical advantages, as it 
promotes the application by the court seized of the domestic law instead of a 
foreign law, it should not be underestimated that an electio fori usually 
depends on procedural factors—ranging from the rules of evidence to the 
varying conditions of efficiency and rapidity of the judicial process, the 
language of the proceedings, the reputation for impartiality of the Court and 
the enforceability of the judgment—which are entirely unconnected with the 
question of the applicable law.123 Moreover, had the parties wanted to 
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designate the lex fori as the their lex contractus, they would have likely 
expressed their will in a specific clause.124 That said, it remains somehow 
arbitrary that Recital no. 12 of the Rome I Regulation attaches an indicative 
value only to the agreements conferring exclusive jurisdiction on one or more 
courts or tribunals of a Member State. The rationale of what seems to be a 
deliberate125 choice is highly dubious given the universal character of the 
Rome I Regulation.126 
The cautious approach eventually embraced in the Rome I Regulation 
in relation to (exclusive) choice of court agreements should apply also when 
national courts are faced with clauses submitting arbitration in a particular 
country.127 As a matter of fact, national courts (as arbitral tribunals),128 have 
sometimes assumed that the parties, in agreeing to arbitrate the dispute in a 
particular country, have intended the law of that country to apply to the 
substance of the dispute.129 However, in the light of the aforementioned 
considerations, and of the wording of Recital no. 12, the specification of the 
place of arbitration should not be treated as giving rise to conclusive or 
irresistible inference that the parties have further agreed that the law 
governing the contract is to be the law of that country,130 but should be 
considered just one of the relevant factors in inferring a tacit choice.131 
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A tacit choice may also be inferred by the reference in the contract to a 
statute or specific provisions of a certain legal system.132 This factor needs to 
be carefully evaluated since such a reference sometimes aims just to 
incorporate the relevant provision(s) into the terms of the contract 
(materiellrechtliche Verweisung)133 or to provide a paradigm for 
interpretative purposes. 
Since Article 3(1) expressly admits a partial choice of law, the reference 
to a legal rule of a specific country to govern only part of the contract or to 
construe the contract should not amount ipso iure to a tacit designation of the 
law applicable to the contract in its entirety.134 
Another indicating factor could be considered the course of dealing 
developed by the parties. When the parties have subjected their previous 
contractual agreements to a particular law, it can be expected that, in the 
absence of a contrary agreement, the contract to be governed by the law 
previously chosen where the choice of law clause has been omitted in 
circumstances which do not indicate a deliberate change of policy by the 
parties135. The same rationale may apply when an express choice of law can 
be found in related transactions between the same parties.136 
                                                                                                                           
 
132 See Giuliano & Lagarde, supra note 109; see also Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of 
Justice] Jan. 19, 2000, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW-RR] 1002, 2000 (Ger.); Pret., 6 aprile 
1998, Foro it. 1999, I 53, 54 (It.); Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] May 10 1996, 
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW-RR] 1034, 1996 (Ger.); Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal 
Court of Justice] Jan. 14, 1999, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW-RR] 813, 1999 (Ger). 
133 See CHRISTOPHER CLARKSON & JONATHAN HILL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 215 (4th ed. 2011); 
Collins, supra note 89, at para. 32–56; RICHARD PLENDER & MICHAEL WILDERSPIN, THE EUROPEAN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OBLIGATIONS, para. 6-010 (3d ed. 2009). 
134 See FERRARI, supra note 54, at para. 33; MAGNUS, supra note 72, at para. 89; MARTINY, supra 
note 116, at para. 57; see also Oberlandesgericht Munchen [OLG] [Munich Higher Regional Court] 
Oct. 3, 24 U 474/87 (referencing case law where a foreign law for interpretative purposes has been 
considered as an explicit choice of the law applicable to the contract). 
135 See Giuliano & Lagarde, supra note 109, at 17 (1980); FERRARI, supra note 54, at para. 32; 
MAGNUS, supra note 72, at para. 89; MARTINY, supra note 116, at para. 66; see also VILLANI, supra note 
9, at 69. 
136 See Giuliano & Lagarde, supra note 109; Blue Sky One Ltd. v. Mahan Air [2009] EWHC 
(Comm) 3314. 
 
2019-2020] THE CISG AND THE CHOICE OF LAW 271 
 
Vol. 38 (2019-2020) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2020.188 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
Factors like the place of the conclusion of the contract,137 the use of a 
certain language for the contract or for the negotiations,138 the recourse to a 
certain currency of payment,139 and an agreement on the place of 
performance140 are, at best, not sufficient indicators of the parties’ tacit 
choice of law.141 Moreover, the reference to circumstances which are 
significant for the closest connection test under Article 4 Rome I Regulation 
reveals an approach which is not in line with the research of a real, rather 
than a hypothetical, choice of law by the parties.142 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The analysis undertaken started from the premise that party autonomy 
is nowadays the ruling principle in contract conflicts. In the context of 
international sales contracts, choice of law agreements are often employed as 
a transaction-planning tool and in some instances represent a gateway issue 
to the CISG [Articles 1(1)(b) and 6]. 
In light of the particular nature of the pacta de lege utenda and their 
autonomous standing vis-à-vis the international sales contracts in which they 
might be incorporated, it is suggested that choice of law agreements should 
be treated as separate contracts. As a consequence, for the purpose of the 
CISG, disputes on the existence or the (formal) validity of choice of law 
agreements should not be solved tout court on the basis of the CISG, as the 
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law prima facie governing the main contract, but should be dealt with by 
referring to the conflict of laws of the forum. 
This carries two (possibly complex) implications. On the one hand, 
national courts should identify the modal choice of law rules to be concretely 
applied. On the other hand, given the bootstrap principle employed in some 
private international law regimes, it would still be possible to sing with 
Professor Flechtner—to whom this short contribution is dedicated—that “we 
have the C-I-S-G.” 
